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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jayson L. Woods appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon a
jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit robbery and
accepting the earnings of a prostitute.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Woods was running an escort service. (2/1/17 Tr., p. 1703, L. 3 – p. 1705, L. 18.)
Abigail Williams would perform sexual acts with men for money and give the money to
Woods. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1482, L. 13 – p. 1495, L. 18; Ex. 104, 107, 107A.) They would
post advertisements for sexual services on websites. (Id.) Woods would handle the
communications with the clients. (Id.) Woods considered himself to be operating as a
“manager.” (Id.)
However, Woods decided that Ms. Williams was not bringing in enough money.
(1/30/17 Tr., p. 1501, Ls. 1-3.) On the morning of April 27, 2016, Woods, Kelly
Schneider and Daniel Henkel placed fake female escort advertisements. (2/1/17 Tr., p.
1712, L. 15 – p. 1715, L. 16.) The idea was to have people respond to the advertisements
and then take their money. (Id.) When someone responded to a fake advertisement,
Woods set up a meeting in an out of the way place near Lake Lowell. (Id.) The plan was
when the client arrived, Mr. Schneider would “jump out of the woods, [and] grab the
guy’s money.” (Id.) If need be Mr. Schneider would break the client’s car window. (Id.)
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However, when the client arrived, driving a white truck, he spotted Mr. Schneider and
Mr. Henkel hiding in the woods, and drove off. (Id.)
The next night, Woods picked up Kevin Tracy, his half-brother. (1/23/17 Tr., p.
655, L. 10 – p. 669, L. 8.) Woods was driving and Mr. Schneider, Mr. Henkel and Ms.
Williams were also in the car.

(Id.) Woods and the others put up a fake female

advertisement. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1501, L. 19 – p. 1502, L. 2.) The idea was they would
ambush whoever responded and take their money. (Id.)
In addition, Mr. Schneider, Mr. Tracy and Mr. Henkel all posted online
advertisements using their own pictures and offering to perform sexual acts with men for
money. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1504, L. 23 – p. 1506, L. 5.) However, Mr. Schneider and Mr.
Tracy were both straight and only Mr. Henkel, who was bisexual, was going to actually
perform the sexual acts. (Id.) The plan was if anyone responded to Mr. Schneider’s or
Mr. Tracy’s advertisements they would just take the money and go without performing
the sexual act. (Id.)
After driving around for a while, Mr. Schneider informed the car that someone
responded to his online advertisement on Backpage.com and they were going to meet at
Walmart. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 669, L. 12 – p. 676, L. 20.) The person who responded was
later identified as Steven Nelson. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 774, Ls. 2-14; 1/24/17 Tr., p. 843, L. 6
– p. 844, L. 6; 1/26/17 Tr., p. 1153, L. 10 – p. 1154, L. 7; Exs. 21-23.)
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Woods dropped Mr. Schneider off at Walmart. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 676, L. 18 – p.
679, L. 19.) When Mr. Schneider got back into the car it looked like he had been
running. (Id.) Mr. Schneider explained that he took the money from Mr. Nelson without
performing the sexual act. (Id.) Mr. Schneider gave the money to Woods, and Woods
gave some of it back to Mr. Schneider. (Id.)
After driving around some more, Mr. Nelson began texting Mr. Schneider again.
(1/23/17 Tr., p. 685, L. 1 – p. 687, L. 23.) Mr. Nelson wanted to meet back up with Mr.
Schneider. (Id.) Woods told Mr. Schneider what to text to Mr. Nelson. (Id.) Woods,
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Henkel and Ms. Williams went to a gas station. (1/30/17
Tr., p. 1511, L. 7 – p. 1512, L. 16.) Woods told Ms. Williams to take her time in the store
because he needed to talk to the men without her presence. (Id.) Woods did not trust Ms.
Williams because she had called the police on him before. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1543, L. 14 –
p.1544, L. 5, p. 1545, Ls. 7-23.)
After leaving the gas station, Woods drove Mr. Henkel and Mr. Tracy to Lake
Lowell and dropped them off. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 693, L. 21 – p. 696, L. 18.) Woods asked
them if they were in it “100 percent.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 693, L. 21 – p. 696, L. 18; 1/26/17
Tr., p. 1170, L. 22 – p. 1171, L. 11; 1/30/17 Tr., p. 1515, Ls. 12-19; 1/31/17 Tr., p. 1650,
L. 15 – p. 1651, L. 3.)
Woods told Mr. Tracy and Mr. Henkel to hide in the bushes because it would be
easier for them to run up and help Mr. Schneider. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1513, L. 7 – p. 1514, L.
3

12.) Woods told them, “No matter what, get the money.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 693, L. 21 – p.
696, L. 18.) Woods then drove Mr. Schneider to Walmart to re-meet up with Mr. Nelson.
(See 1/23/17 Tr., p. 689, Ls. 22-25.)

The plan was Mr. Nelson would drive Mr.

Schneider to Lake Lowell near Gott’s Point, where Mr. Tracy and Mr. Henkel were
hiding. (Id.) Woods texted Mr. Schneider and instructed Mr. Schneider to steal Mr.
Nelson’s car. (2/1/17 Tr., p. 1832, L. 18 – p. 1833, L. 19.)
Mr. Tracy and Mr. Henkel hid down by the lake, near Gott’s Point. (1/23/17 Tr.,
p. 704, L. 21 – p. 706 L. 21; Ex. 179.) While he was hiding, Mr. Tracy texted back and
forth with Woods. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 706, L. 22 – p. 708, L. 2.) Mr. Henkel informed
Woods that he would use the pipe to get Mr. Nelson out of his car if he needed to. (Id.)
Woods responded “Good. Do what you have to.” (Id.) After about 30 minutes, Mr.
Schneider texted and said he was on his way. (Id.) Mr. Tracy heard a car pull up and
people get out. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 707, L. 25 – p. 711, L. 3; Ex 189.) After a couple of
minutes Mr. Tracy heard a scuffle and Mr. Schneider yelled for Mr. Henkel. (Id.)
Mr. Tracy saw Mr. Schneider on top of Mr. Nelson with a knee in his back, and
pushing his face into the dirt. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 711, L. 4 – p. 714, L. 24; 1/26/17 Tr., p.
1153, L. 10 – p. 1154, L. 7.) Mr. Schneider repeatedly yelled different versions of “Why
do you think I would do this again?” (Id.) Mr. Nelson screamed in pain, “Please don’t
hurt me. You can have whatever you want.” (Id.) Mr. Nelson was on the ground and did
not fight back. (Id.) Mr. Schneider threw Mr. Nelson’s shoes. (Id.) Mr. Schneider
4

kicked Mr. Nelson 20 to 30 times. (Id.) Mr. Schneider was wearing tan army combat
boots. (Id.) Mr. Schneider yelled at Mr. Tracy to get into the victim’s car. (Id.)
Mr. Schneider kept beating Mr. Nelson and stripped him of all his clothes.
(1/23/17 Tr., p. 713, L. 20 – p. 719, L. 10; Ex. 96.) Mr. Schneider threw the clothes in
the back of Mr. Nelson’s car. (Id.) Mr. Schneider drove off with Mr. Tracy and then
picked up Mr. Henkel. (Id.) They drove around looking for a place to ditch Mr. Nelson’s
car. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 719, L. 2 – p. 726, L. 14.) They dropped Mr. Nelson’s car off at
some apartments, and then walked over to K-Mart where they were picked up by Woods
and Ms. Williams. (Id.)
Woods asked Mr. Schneider if they left the victim breathing, and Mr. Schneider
said “Yes. Bloody but breathing.” (1/23/17 Tr. p. 726, Ls. 10-16.) Woods did not
appear surprised and was calm. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 727, Ls. 5-23.) Woods did not show any
remorse. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 776, Ls. 5-12.) They split the money taken from Mr. Nelson,
but Mr. Henkel did not get any because he ran away. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1651, L. 19 – 1652,
L. 10.) Woods told them to keep their mouths shut. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1546, L. 18 – p.
1547, L. 14.)
After he was beaten and stripped naked, Mr. Nelson started looking for help. (See
1/24/17 Tr., p. 831, L. 3 – p. 833, L. 7, p. 835, L. 5 – p. 839, L. 1, p. 861, L. 18 – p. 863,
L. 25; Ex. 4.) After banging on doors, local resident called 911 and Deputy Odenborg
responded. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 841, L. 24 – p. 844, L. 6.) Mr. Nelson told Deputy Odenborg
5

that he had responded to an advertisement from Backpage.com for a male escort.
(1/24/17 Tr., p. 846, L. 8 – p. 848, L. 22.) He was beaten, stripped, and his car stolen.
(Id.) Mr. Nelson explained that he had Hepatitis C, cirrhosis of the liver, and it felt like
his ribs were broken and he was “fairly certain” he was dying. (Id.) An ambulance
responded and took Mr. Nelson to a hospital. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 848, L. 16 – p. 849, L. 4.)
Mr. Nelson was bleeding from the lungs and went into cardiac arrest. (1/24/17
Tr., p. 906, L. 14 – p. 919, L. 13.) Mr. Nelson died because of a heart attack that was the
result of the attack. (1/25/17 Tr., p. 919, Ls. 7-13, p. 963, L. 22 – p. 964, L. 3, p. 977, Ls.
7-13.)
After Ms. Williams went home and got cleaned up, she became concerned and
called the police. (1/30/17 Tr., 1537, Ls. 1-19.) After an investigation, a grand jury
indicted Woods on four counts: murder in the first degree, robbery, conspiracy to commit
robbery and accepting the earnings of a prostitute. (R., pp. 32-35.)
Thirty-five days before trial, the state moved to continue the jury trial because it
was still having difficulty accessing the data in Woods’ cell phone. (See R., pp. 206-209;
see also 1/27/17 Tr., p. 1420, L. 14 – p. 1424, L. 18.) Woods objected and the district
court denied the motion to continue. (R., pp. 208-209.) The case proceeded to jury trial.
(R., pp. 412-424, 428-433, 453-460, 463-480, 491-501.)
At trial, Mr. Tracy testified that Woods was the one who was “pimping people
out.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 688, Ls. 15-19.)
6

Q. Under your understanding, what was Jayson’s [Woods’] role in all
this?
A. He was supposed to be the person that makes the ads. He’s basically
the one pimping people out.
(1/23/17 Tr., p. 688, Ls. 15-19.) Mr. Tracy testified that Mr. Schneider was kicking Mr.
Nelson in the stomach and chest and Mr. Tracy “could hear how hard the kick was when
the boot hit the victim.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 749, L. 13 – p. 750, L. 4.) He also testified that
when they met up with Woods after the attack, Woods did not show remorse and
appeared “okay that this just happened.” (1/24/17 Tr., p. 776, Ls. 5-12.)
Ms. Williams testified about Woods and the others putting up fake female
advertisements in order to rob people that responded. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1500, L. 19 – p.
1502, L. 2.) She also testified that if anyone responded to Mr. Schneider’s or Mr. Tracy’s
advertisements they would just take the money and not perform the sexual act. (1/30/17
Tr., p. 1504, L. 23 – p. 1506, L. 5.) She also testified Mr. Schneider was very adamant
that he was not going to perform a sexual act with Mr. Nelson because he was not gay.
(1/30/17 Tr., p. 1513, L. 7 – p. 1514, L. 12.) The plan was to rob Mr. Nelson. (Id.)
Detective Wilson testified regarding the communications on Mr. Nelson’s phone.
(1/26/17 Tr., p. 1243, L. 7 – p. 1259; L.23; Exs. 148.) The police were also able to
recover communications from Mr. Schneider’s phone. (See 1/27/17 Tr., p. 1262, L. 25 –
p. 1273, L. 4; Exs. 103, 147, 149, 152.)
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Detective Lukasik, a computer forensic examiner, testified how the police
extracted data from the cell phones. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1346, L. 1 – p. 1364, L. 10; Exs.
139,143, 144,145, 147, 301) However, Detective Lukasik was unable to extract data
from Woods’ phone. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1359, L. 1 – p. 1364, L. 10.) He reached out to FBI
examiners. (Id.) He contacted an examiner in Omaha, who contacted FBI headquarters
in Quantico. (Id.) After some time, the phone was returned to Detective Lukasik. (Id.)
Detective Lukasik was then able to get permission to send the phone to Quantico,
Virginia. (Id.) Eventually, an engineer in Quantico was able to provide a forensic image
of Woods’ phone, which is a “bit-by-bit copy of the contents of the phone.” (Id.) Using
the forensic image Detective Lukasik was able to process the phone and provide a report.
(Id.) Detective Lukasik received the forensic image on Monday, January 23, 2017, and
provided a working copy of his report regarding the data extraction on Tuesday, January
24, 2017, and was able to provide a final report “last night” on Thursday, January 26,
2017. (Id.)
The state moved to allow the engineer from Quantico, Steve Berrios, to testify via
a video teleconference system, Skype, regarding how the data was extracted from Woods’
phone. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1420, L. 14 – p. 1424, L. 18.) The state had previously asked for
a continuance on this basis and Woods had objected. (Id.) The state explained it had sent
the phones out in May, approximately 8 months prior to trial, and exercised due diligence
in trying to get the phones processed, and had only now gotten the report. (Id.)
8

Woods objected to the expert appearing via two-way video teleconference,
because he believed it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
(1/27/17 Tr., p. 1420, L. 14 – p. 1424, L. 18.) The district court explained that it had
done some research and had found cases that had allowed for testimony via video “to
establish chain of custody and foundation for the admission of these things, of this type of
evidence.” (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1423, L. 12 – p. 1424, L. 18.) The district court allowed Mr.
Berrios to testify and be cross-examined via video teleconference, so long as his
testimony was only for foundational purposes. (Id.)
Mr. Berrios, a digital acquisition, data acquisition and recovery technician,
testified, via video teleconference from Virginia, that he copied data from the phone and
sent it to Detective Lukasik. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1426, L. 10 – p. 1431, L. 22.) Woods crossexamined Mr. Berrios in open court. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1431, Ls. 4-22.) Detective Bailey
testified regarding extractions from Woods’ cell phone. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1432, L. 24 – p.
1447, L. 1, p. 1467, L. 12 – p. 1479, L. 13; Exs. 200, 201, 206, 206A, 208, 215 301.)
Detective Gentry testified that he interviewed Woods. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1601, Ls.
8-19; Exs. 5-8.) Woods admitted to Detective Gentry that Mr. Schneider was going to
rob Mr. Nelson at the lake. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1621, L. 21 – p. 1622, L. 5.) Woods admitted
that Mr. Schneider was not going to perform the sexual act, and was just going to take
Mr. Nelson’s money. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1645, Ls. 9-23.) Woods said they split the money
afterwards. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1651, L. 19 – 1652, L. 10.) Woods told Mr. Schneider that if
9

he can do it, to go ahead and rob Mr. Nelson. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1661, L. 13 – p. 1662, L.
9.)
Woods testified and admitted that he had accepted the earnings of a prostitute.
(2/1/17 Tr., p. 1790, Ls. 1-23.) He also testified that on the morning of April 27, 2016,
Woods, Mr. Schneider and Mr. Henkel placed fake female escort advertisements. (2/1/17
Tr., p. 1712, L. 15 – p. 1715, L. 16.) The idea was to have people respond to the
advertisements and then take their money. (Id.) Woods admitted that he lied several
times regarding this case in an attempt to keep himself out of trouble. (2/1/17 Tr., p.
1781, L. 25 – p. 1784, L. 20.)
Woods testified that when he dropped Mr. Schneider off to meet Mr. Nelson the
second time, Mr. Schneider said he was going to take Mr. Nelson’s money. (2/1/17 Tr.,
p. 1821, L. 16 – p. 1823, L. 5.) Woods knew Mr. Schneider was an aggressive and
violent guy. (2/1/17 Tr., p. 1824, L. 21 – p. 1825, L. 17.) Woods testified that he texted
Mr. Schneider, and instructed Mr. Schneider to steal Mr. Nelson’s car. (2/1/17 Tr., p.
1832, L. 18 – p. 1833, L. 19.)
The jury found Woods guilty of accepting the earnings of a prostitute, conspiracy
to commit robbery, robbery, and first degree murder. (2/2/17 Tr., p. 2001, L. 19 – p.
2002, L. 19; R., pp. 510-511.) At sentencing the state recommended the robbery charge
be merged into the murder charge because it was a felony murder charge based on a
robbery. (4/11/17 Tr., p. 199, L. 16 – p. 200, L. 6.) The district court agreed and stated
10

“[t]he robbery charge and sentence is subsumed by the murder charge in Idaho.” (4/11/17
Tr., p. 235, Ls. 17-18.) The district court entered convictions for accepting the earnings
of a prostitute, conspiracy to commit robbery, and first degree murder (R., pp. 579-583,
585-587.)
The district court sentenced Woods to life with twenty-three years fixed on the
first degree murder conviction, and life with ten years fixed on the conspiracy to commit
robbery.

(R., pp. 585-587.)

The district court ordered these two sentences to run

concurrently. (Id.) The district court also sentenced Woods to five years plus ten years
fixed for accepting the earnings of a prostitute, to run consecutively to the other
sentences. (R., pp. 585-587.) Woods timely appealed. (R., pp. 588-592.)

11

ISSUES
Woods states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether the district court erred by permitting Steve Barrios [sic] to
testify via Skype?

II.

Whether the district court committed fundamental error by
imposing sentences for both the conspiracy charge and the felony
murder charge in violation of Mr. Woods’s right to be free from
double jeopardy?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Woods failed to show the district court erred when it permitted Steve
Berrios to testify via two-way video teleconference?
2.
Has Woods failed to show the district court committed fundamental error
when it imposed sentences for both conspiracy to commit robbery and first degree
murder, because conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense of
first degree murder?

12

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Err By Permitting Steve Berrios To Testify Via Two-Way
Video Teleconference
A.

Introduction
The district court permitted Steve Berrios to testify via two-way videoconference

from Quantico, Virginia, about foundational issues regarding the extraction of data from
Woods’ cell phone. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1423, L. 12 – p. 1424, L. 18.) Woods crossexamined Mr. Berrios in open court. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1431, Ls. 4-22.) On appeal, Woods
claims his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated because Mr. Berrios was
not physically present in the courtroom. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-13.) Woods argues
the district court was required to make a “necessity” finding, that an important public
policy was served by having Mr. Berrios testify via two-way video teleconference. (See
id.)
Woods’ argument on appeal fails because a two-way video conference is different
than a one-way video conference, which requires an important public policy under
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). Further, the Idaho Criminal Rules allow
for testimony, like Mr. Berrios’, to be presented via video conference, without the need of
a necessity finding.

See I.C.R. 43.2.

Woods’ right to confront witnesses was not

violated.

13

Further, even if a necessity finding was required, the timing of the report, coupled
with the physical and logistical problems of flying an expert engineer across the country
and the limited nature of the testimony, means any necessity requirement was met.
Woods has failed to show his right to confront witnesses was violated and has failed to
show the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over which [the appellate court]

exercises free review.” State v. Baeza, 161 Idaho 38, 40, 383 P.3d 1208, 1210 (2016)
(citing Morgan v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 160 Idaho 47, 51, 368 P.3d 990, 994 (2016)). If
the defendant objected at trial, and a constitutional error is established on appeal, a
reversal is not necessary if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict
would have been the same had the error not occurred. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961,
973 (2010)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Permitted Mr. Berrios To Give Limited
Testimony Via Two-Way Video Teleconference
“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the

States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Craig,
497 U.S. at 844. The Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face
14

meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. Id. (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (additional citations omitted)). The United States Supreme Court
has “never held, however, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants
the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial.” Id.
(emphasis original). The “preference” is for “face-to-face confrontation” at trial. Id. at
848 (citation omitted). “The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Id. at 845. The
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defendant is given a full and fair
opportunity for cross-examination at trial. See id. at 847 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69 (1980); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-744 (1987); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-407 (1965); 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 150
(J. Chadbourn rev. 1974)). “The salutary effects of face-to-face confrontation include 1)
the giving of testimony under oath; 2) the opportunity for cross-examination; 3) the
ability of the fact-finder to observe demeanor evidence; and 4) the reduced risk that a
witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent defendant when testifying in his presence.”
United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-
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846). The Eleventh Circuit determined that where video testimony preserved these four
characteristics of in-court testimony, the right to confront witnesses is not violated. Id.
The closed-circuit television procedure utilized for [the witness’]
testimony preserved all of these characteristics of in-court testimony: [The
witness] was sworn; he was subject to full cross-examination; he testified
in full view of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [the witness] gave
this testimony under the eye of [the defendant] himself. [The defendant]
forfeited none of the constitutional protections of confrontation.
Id.
Here, the central concern of the Confrontation Clause was addressed. Woods had
a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Berrios and did in fact cross-examine
him. “Two-way video conference testimony in criminal trials is constitutional because it
provides the necessary protections and upholds the goals intended by the Confrontation
Clause. The procedure is also more protective of defendants’ right to confrontation than
other accepted methods of testimony, such as [Federal Criminal] Rule 15 depositions.”
Hadley Perry, Virtually Face-to-Face: The Confrontation Clause and the Use of Two-Way
Video Testimony, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 565, 586–587 (2008). Two-way video
testimony is also superior to one-way video testimony, which has been deemed
constitutional. See id.
Video conference testimony fulfills the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause as intended throughout history. As exemplified by Paul’s trial in
biblical times, the prosecution of Christians under Roman Emperor Trajan,
the trials of Sir Walter Raleigh and Freeborn John in seventeenth century
England, and by the Salem witch trials in colonial America, the main goals
of the right to confrontation were (1) to afford the defendant the
opportunity to receive accusations directly from the mouth of his accuser,
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(2) to prevent false accusations against the defendant by those unwilling to
state such allegations to the defendant’s face, and (3) to allow the judge
and jury to view the demeanor of the witnesses testifying. Each of these
goals is safeguarded by the two-way video testimony procedure.
Id. Further, the use of video testimony is not inherently prejudicial to a defendant. See
Baeza, 161 Idaho at 42, 383 P.3d at 1212.
Woods relies upon Craig, 497 U.S. at 844. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13.) In
Craig, the United States Supreme Court determined that, provided there is a finding of
necessity, the Confrontation Clause was not violated when a child witness testified via a
one-way closed-circuit television. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857. This one-way television
procedure prevented the child witness from seeing the defendant and prevented a “faceto-face” confrontation. See id. at 856-857. Woods argues that even though Craig dealt
only with one-way video testimony, it should be applied to two-way video testimony as
well and a court is required to make a finding of necessity prior to allowing two-way
video testimony. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.) In support of his argument he cites
to decisions out of Maryland and the Eleventh Circuit. (See id. (citing White v. State,
116 A.3d 520, 544 (Ct. App. Md. 2015); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.
2006).) “This Court should agree with the courts in White and Yates and hold that the
State’s concerns about convenience and efficiency are not important public policies that
support the admission of testimony by two-way video conference.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
11.)
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However, Idaho has already decided that a two-way video conference does not
require a specific necessity finding. Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 permits forensic testimony
by video teleconference. Nothing in the rule requires a “necessity” finding. See I.C.R.
43.2. While Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 was not invoked by either party, or the district
court, the existence of the rule does show that Idaho has decided that the Maryland v.
Craig standard for one-way video testimony does not apply to two-way video testimony,
especially when that testimony is expert in nature. Thus, this Court need not look to other
courts to determine how Idaho views two-way video testimony; this Court can look to
Idaho’s own rules.
For the first time on appeal Woods argues that Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 is
unconstitutional in light of Maryland v. Craig. (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) As an initial
matter Woods’ argument that Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 is unconstitutional is not
preserved. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-276, 396 P.3d 700, 704705 (2017). Woods argued below that allowing Mr. Berrios to testify via two-way
videoconference violated his right to confront witnesses, because it may be possible to fly
Mr. Berrios out to Idaho from Virginia. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1422, Ls. 3-20.) The argument
that Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 is unconstitutional was not raised before the district court
and should not be considered on appeal. Even if it were considered, there is nothing in
Maryland v. Craig which would render Idaho Criminal Rue 43.2 unconstitutional.
Maryland v. Craig dealt with vulnerable child witnesses testifying via one-way video in
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order to avoid a face-to-face confrontation with the defendant. See Craig, 497 U.S. at
856-857. Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 addresses forensic testimony via two-way video
teleconference. See I.C.R. 43.2. The Rule explicitly requires that the forensic scientist be
able to see the defendant. See I.C.R. 43.2(a)(2) (“The defendant, counsel from both sides,
and the forensic scientist must be able to see and hear each other simultaneously and
communicate with each other during the proceeding.”). The “face-to-face” concerns due
to a one-way video teleconference as detailed in Craig, where the witness does not have
to look at the defendant, are simply not present in Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2. Thus Idaho
has determined that the Craig “necessity” standard does not apply to these types of video
teleconferences.
However, even if the Craig “necessity” standard applies, that standard was met.
Woods relies upon a Maryland case, which held that “Where considerations beyond mere
convenience and expedience are involved, however, the factual setting of a case may
support a finding of necessity to justify the absence of a witness’s physical presence at
trial.” White, 116 A.3d at 545-546. Here, the physical limitations of attempting to get a
last minute witness across the country before the trial ends justified the absence of Mr.
Berrios’ physical presence at trial. The state argued that it was a “necessity” to have Mr.
Berrios testify via two-way video teleconference because just the “last day” they were
able to provide a copy of the cell phone data recovery to defense counsel. (1/27/17 Tr., p.
1420, L. 14 – p. 1421, L. 6.) The state sent the phone out in Mary, approximately 8
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months prior to trial, to be processed. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1422, L. 21 – p. 1423, L. 11.)
When the state knew it was having technical problems extracting data from Woods’
phone, it moved, thirty-five days before trial, to continue the trial. (See R., pp. 206-209;
see also 1/27/17 Tr., p. 1420, L. 14 – p. 1424, L. 18.) Woods objected and the district
court denied the motion to continue. (R., pp. 208-209.) The forensic expert was finally
able to extract the data from Woods’ phone and the detective received the image file on
Monday, January 23, 2017. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1360, L. 2 – p. 1363, L. 9.) The detective
was only able to provide a final report on Thursday, January 26, 2017. (Id.) The next
day, Friday, January 27, 2017, the state moved to allow Mr. Berrios to provide
foundational testimony from Virginia to provide more details on how the data was
extracted from Woods’ cell phone. (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1420, L. 14 – p. 1424, L. 18.) The
district court considered the necessity of using a two-way video conference, including the
costs and “time limits of flying somebody from Quantico, Virginia here to Idaho just to
identify the process of getting into the phone[.]” (1/27/17 Tr., p. 1423, L. 12 – p. 1424, L.
18.) The district court properly analyzed the necessity of the situation and limited the
testimony of Mr. Berrios to purely foundational issues. (Id.)
The district court properly found, that in these circumstances, it was necessary to
permit Mr. Berrios provide limited testimony via two-way video teleconference. Thus,
even if the Maryland v. Craig standard applies to two-way video teleconference
testimony, it was met here.
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D.

Even If It Was Error To Permit Mr. Berrios To Testify Via Two-Way Video
Teleconference, That Error Was Harmless Because The Verdict Would Have
Been The Same Without His Testimony
Woods’ Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was not

violated because he had a full and fair opportunity to see and cross-examine Mr. Berrios.
However, even if it was error to allow Mr. Berrios to testify via two-way video
conference, that error was harmless. An error is harmless if the State proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same had the error not occurred.
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citing State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). If the district court had denied the
motion to permit Mr. Berrios to testify via two-way video teleconference, then it appears
likely that Mr. Berrios would not have testified at all. However, the verdict would have
been the same had this occurred. Mr. Berrios’ testimony was limited to explaining how
he extracted the data and made a copy, a forensic image, of the data from Woods’ phone
and provided it to Detective Lukasik. (See 1/30/17 Tr., p. 1426, L. 10 – p. 1431, L. 22.)
Q. And you sent the data that you got off it to Don Lukasik?
A. I did.
Q. Other than just parsing to make sure there was actual data removed
from the phone, did you do any analysis of the phone’s contents?
A. I did not.
(1/30/17 Tr., p. 1430, Ls. 17-23.) Mr. Berrios’ testimony only related to the foundational
procedure by which Detective Lukasik accessed the data in Woods’ phone. However,
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Detective Lukasik had already testified, without objection, that Mr. Berrios had extracted
the data and provided him a forensic image of Woods’ phone. (See 1/27/17 Tr. p. 1360,
Ls. 17-20.) Detective Lukasik testified:
And then just recently I talked to the engineer back there who sent
me the extraction files from this phone, and he was able to do it doing the
in circuit so the phone is still intact. But he was able to provide me a
image, a physical image, a forensic physical image of the phone that I was
able to process and provide a report for.
(1/27/17 Tr., p. 1360, Ls. 17-23.) Detective Lukasik explained how a forensic physical
image is created and what it is. (See 1/27/17 Tr., p. 1360, L. 2 – p. 1362, L. 2.) He also
testified that that image was “verified” and there were no changes made to the phone’s
data. (Id.) While the state was engaging in best practices by having Mr. Berrios testify as
to copying the data from the phone, sufficient foundation had already been laid by
Detective Lukasik to admit Woods’ phone into evidence. Evidence from Woods’ phone
would still have been admitted into evidence, and the verdict would have been the same
even without Mr. Berrios’ limited testimony.
Even if Mr. Berrios’ testimony was required to admit data from Woods’ phone,
the verdict would have still been the same. As cited in the factual section, there was
testimony that Woods had planned to place advertisements and then have his coconspirators rob people who responded. (See e.g. 1/30/17 Tr., p. 1501, L. 19 – p. 1502,
L. 2.) Woods told Mr. Tracy and Mr. Henkel to hide in the bushes. (1/30/17 Tr., p. 1513,
L. 7 – p. 1514, L. 12.) Before he dropped Mr. Henkel and Mr. Tracy off at Lake Lowell
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to hide he asked if they were in it “100 percent.” (See 1/23/17 Tr., p. 693, L. 21 – p. 696,
L. 18; 1/26/17 Tr., p. 1170, L. 22 – p. 1171, L. 11; 1/30/17 Tr., p. 1515, Ls. 12-19;
1/31/17 Tr., p. 1650, L. 15 – p. 1651, L. 3.) The plan was to rob Mr. Nelson. (See
1/30/17 Tr., p. 1513, L. 22 – p. 1514, L. 12.) Woods admitted to Detective Gentry that
Mr. Schneider was going to rob Mr. Nelson at the lake. (1/31/17 Tr., p. 1621, L. 21 – p.
1622, L. 5.)
Q. What was his reaction when you would tell him details that didn’t make
sense?
A. So whenever it all came down to it, you know, he was kind of telling
me that the guys were just out playing at the lake. And I’m like, “Listen,
that doesn’t make any sense.”
And he stopped and he said, “Okay, okay, okay, fine. Kelly
[Schneider] was going to rob the guy. They went out to the lake. Kelly
[Schneider] was going to rob the guy.”
(1/31/17 Tr., p. 1621, L. 21 – p. 1622, L. 5.)
In addition to his admissions to Detective Gentry, Woods also made admissions in
his testimony. Woods testified and admitted that he had accepted the earnings of a
prostitute.

(2/1/17 Tr., p. 1790, Ls. 1-23.)

Woods testified that he placed online

advertisements with the goal of robbing people. (See 2/1/17 Tr., p. 1712, L. 15 – p. 1715,
L. 16.) Even if Mr. Berrios’ testimony had been required to admit the data from Woods’
phone, and the data had not been admitted into evidence, the result of the trial would have
been the same.
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Finally, Woods suffered no appreciable prejudice from Mr. Berrios’ lack of
physical presence while testifying. His testimony is admissible. Although seeing a
witness live may gave insight on credibility, there is no reason to believe jurors would
view Mr. Berrios’ credibility differently if they could observe his physical presence. Mr.
Berrios was not a witness that was subject to credibility attacks. Especially considering
the limited and technical nature of Mr. Berrios’ testimony, it is difficult to ascertain any
potential prejudice from his lack of physical presence. There was no error in permitting
Mr. Berrios to testify via two-way video teleconference, but if it was error it was
harmless.

II.
The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error When It Sentenced Woods
Because Conspiracy To Commit Robbery Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of First
Degree Murder
A.

Introduction
The jury found Woods guilty of accepting the earnings of a prostitute, conspiracy

to commit robbery, robbery, and first degree murder. (2/2/17 Tr., p. 2001, L. 19 – p.
2002, L. 19; R., pp. 510-511.) At the sentencing, the state recommended, and the district
court agreed to merge the robbery charge into the first degree murder charge. (4/11/17
Tr., p. 199, L. 16 – p. 200, L. 6, p. 235, Ls. 17-18.) The district court entered convictions
for accepting the earnings of a prostitute, conspiracy to commit robbery, and first degree
murder.

(R., pp. 579-583, 585-587.)

Woods now argues, for the first time, that
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conspiracy to commit robbery is a lesser included offense of first degree murder under
Idaho’s “pleading theory” because an element of the felony murder charge was robbery.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 13-20.) Woods fails to show these two convictions violate
Idaho’s double jeopardy protections and fails to show fundamental error because
conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense of robbery.
Woods’ argument focuses upon cases which relied upon Idaho Code § 18-301.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-20 (citing State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567-568, 682
P.2d 105, 108-109 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Sterely, 112 Idaho 1097, 739 P.2d 396
(1987).) Idaho Code § 18-301 was repealed by Senate Law 1995, chapter 16, § 1,
effective February 13, 1995. Idaho Code § 18-301 was repealed in 1995.
The proper test is not Idaho Code § 18-301, but Idaho’s pleading theory, which
requires an examination of the charging document. See State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79,
87, 383 P.3d 1249, 1257 (2016). From the face of the indictment, conspiracy to commit
robbery is not a lesser included offense of robbery and thus not an element of first degree
murder. (See R., pp. 32-35.) In Idaho a defendant can be convicted of a conspiracy and
the offense which was the ultimate purpose of the conspiracy. See, e.g., State v. SanchezCastro, 157 Idaho 647, 649, 339 P.3d 372, 374 (2014). Woods has failed to show
fundamental error because convictions for both conspiracy to commit robbery and first
degree murder do not violate double jeopardy.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A double jeopardy challenge made for the first time on appeal will be considered

under the fundamental error analysis. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 657, 330 P.3d 400,
403 (Ct. App. 2014).

“In order to obtain relief on appeal, a defendant claiming

fundamental error must demonstrate that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for
reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3)
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Id. (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)).

C.

Woods Has Failed To Show That The Entry Of Judgments Finding Him Guilty Of
First Degree Murder And Conspiracy To Commit Robbery Violated Double
Jeopardy And Constituted Fundamental Error
A conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense of robbery. Thus,

it is not a lesser included offense of the element of robbery in a felony first degree murder
charge. Woods has failed to show fundamental error.

1.

Conspiracy To Commit Robbery Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of
Robbery And Thus It Is Not A Lesser Included Offense Of First Degree
Murder And Woods Convictions Do Not Violate The Idaho Constitution’s
Protections Against Double Jeopardy

Woods argues, for the first time on appeal, that conspiracy to commit robbery is a
lesser included offense of robbery and thus is an element of felony first degree murder
and as a result his convictions for both violate the Idaho Constitution’s protection against
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double jeopardy. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-30.) Contrary to Woods’ argument,
based upon the face of the information, conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser
included offense of robbery, and thus is not the means or an element by which the felony
first degree murder was charged.
“Under both the federal and Idaho double jeopardy clauses, ‘a defendant may not
be convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense.’” State v. McKinney, 153
Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,
756, 810 P.2d 680, 694 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho
425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991)).

Determining whether a defendant’s prosecution or

conviction and punishment for two offenses violates the Fifth Amendment under the
federal constitution requires application of the Blockburger test. Moad, 156 Idaho at 658,
330 P.3d at 404 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). Under
the Blockburger test, the court looks to the statutory elements of the offenses and, if the
statutory definition of each crime requires proof of an additional element that the other
does not, they constitute separate offenses. Id. (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.)
Idaho has adopted a “pleading theory” test. See id. “Under the pleading theory, a lesser
included offense is one “alleged in the information as a means or element of the
commission of the higher offense.” McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841, 291 P.3d at 1040 (citing
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434, 614 P.2d 970, 974 (1980)). “Under Idaho’s
pleading theory, whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another crime can be
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determined from the face of the record simply by reading the information charging each
crime.” Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87, 383 P.3d at 1257 (citing McKinney, 153 Idaho at
841, 291 P.3d at 1040).
Woods does not argue that his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery and
first degree murder violate the federal constitution’s protections against double jeopardy.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-19.) Wood focuses solely on the Idaho Constitution and
the “pleading theory.” (See id.) Woods argues that “the acts by which Mr. Woods was
alleged to have furthered the conspiracy were the means or method by which he aided and
abetted the robbery, and thus, the murder.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)
From the face of the information, conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. As an initial matter, Woods’ implication that a
conspiracy is incorporated in, or part of, aiding and abetting is without merit. Idaho has
done away with the distinction between those who “aid and abet” in the commission of
the crime and those who are “principals.” See I.C. §§ 18-204, 19-1430. “In Idaho there
is no distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and it is unnecessary the
charging document allege any facts other than what is necessary to convict a principal.”
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 976, 188 P.3d 912, 918 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19–1430).
In contrast, “a conspiracy consists of an agreement between two or more persons
to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of
that objective, as well as the intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive
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crime.” State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct.App.1990)). Criminal conspiracy is an
entirely separate crime that is completed when two or more persons combine or conspire
to commit any crime:
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any
crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1)
or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the
combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable upon conviction in
the same manner and to the same extent as is provided under the laws of
the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each
combined to commit.
I.C. § 18-1701. Conspiracy does not require a completed crime. State v. Nevarez, 142
Idaho 616, 620-21, 130 P.3d 1154, 1158-59 (Ct. App. 2005).
Section 18–1701 defines only the crime of criminal conspiracy and
provides a penalty for that crime of conspiring. It says nothing at all about
who may be deemed guilty of the crime to which the conspiracy is directed
if that crime is in fact completed. Section 18–204 is the statute that
identifies who may be convicted for a completed crime committed by a
third party.
Id.
Woods’ initial implication, that somehow a conspiracy is incorporated into aiding
and abetting, is simply not correct. Since there is no difference between someone who
“aids and abets” and someone who is a “principal” then Woods has to be treated as a
principal defendant for both the robbery and the first degree murder charge. In Idaho a
defendant can be convicted for a crime and the conspiracy to commit that crime. See e.g.
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State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 649, 339 P.3d 372, 374 (2014) (convicted of
trafficking in methamphetamine and in conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine); State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 465-66, 272 P.3d 417, 437-38 (2012) (convicted of first degree
murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder); McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho
286, 289, 396 P.3d 1168, 1171 (2017) (convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to
commit murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery); State v. Harris, 141 Idaho
721, 727, 117 P.3d 135, 141 (Ct. App. 2005) (convicted of trafficking in
methamphetamine and conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine); State v. Lemmons,
161 Idaho 652, 653, 389 P.3d 197, 198 (Ct. App. 2017), review denied (Feb. 28, 2017)
(convicted of two counts of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine and two counts of
trafficking in methamphetamine).
Turning to the face of the information in this case, the conspiracy to commit a
robbery is not a lesser included offense of robbery and thus was not an element or means
by which Woods committed first degree murder. (See R., pp. 32-35.) Count I – Murder
alleged:
That the Defendant, Jayson L. Woods, on or about the 29th day of
April, 2016, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did aid, abet, assist,
facilitate and/or encourage Kelly Schneider to perpetrate a robbery of
Steven Nelson, during which Kelly Schneider did kill and murder Steven
Nelson.
(R., p. 32.) Count II – Robbery alleged:
That the defendant, Jayson L. Woods, on or about the 29th day of
April, 2016, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did aid, abet, assist,
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facilitate and/or encourage Kelly Schneider to feloniously, intentionally
and by means of force or fear take from the person and or/immediate
presence of Steven Nelson certain personal property, to-wit: case money
and/or clothing and/or a wallet with credit cards inside and/or car keys
and/or a car, the property of Steven Nelson, which was accomplished
against the will of Steven Nelson, in that [] Kelly Schneider choked Steven
Nelson and/or forced Steven Nelson[]to the ground and/or kicked Steven
Nelson and demanded and/or forcibly took Steven Nelson’s personal
property.
(R., p. 33.) Count III: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery alleged:
That the Defendant, Jayson L. Woods, on or about April 28th, 2016
through April 29th, 2016 within Canyon County, State of Idaho, and
elsewhere, the Defendant, Jayson L. Woods, did willfully and knowingly
combine or conspire with Kelly Schneider and/or Daniel Henkel and/or
Kevin Tracy and/or any other person to commit the crime of robbery upon
Steven Nelson, and that in furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the
objects thereof, one or more of the conspirator did the following overt acts
within Canyon County, Idaho:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods drove Kelly
Schneider or Daniel Henkel in a Chevy HHR to meet
Steven Nelson at a Walmart in Nampa, Idaho.
On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods drove Daniel
Henkel and Kevin Tracy in a Chevy HHR to Gott’s Point to
wait for Kelly Schneider to rob Steven Nelson at that
location.
On or about April 29th 2016, Daniel Henkel, armed with a
pipe, waited for the arrival of Kelly Schneider with Steven
Nelson at Gott’s Point.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kevin Tracy also waited for
the arrival of Kelly Schneider with Steven Nelson at Gott’s
Point.
On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods returned with
Kelly Schneider to a Walmart in Nampa Idaho to meet with
Steven Nelson.
On or about April 29th 2016 Kelly Schneider met Steven
Nelson at a Walmart in Nampa Idaho.
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7.

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

On or about April 29th 2016 Kelly Schneider rode with
Steven Nelson to the prearranged location at Gott’s Point in
Canyon County Idaho.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider robbed
Steven Nelson at Gott’s Point.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider drove away
from Gott’s Point in Steven Nelson’s car with Kevin Tracy
and Daniel Henkel.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider, Kevin Tracy,
and Daniel Henkel met back in the Chevy HHR to divide
the proceeds of the robbery.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider gave Kevin
Tracy twenty-five dollars from the proceeds of the robbery.
On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider gave Jayson
Woods forty dollars from the proceeds of the robbery.

(R., pp. 33-34.)
From the face of this indictment, conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser
included offense of robbery. The means or method by which Woods committed robbery
was not through the conspiracy. The references to the robbery in the conspiracy charge
are the object of the conspiracy, and it does not merge with the robbery. See State v.
Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 649, 339 P.3d 372, 374 (2014).
In Sanchez-Castro, the defendant was charged, and convicted, of “one count of
conspiracy to traffic in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine” and “one count of
trafficking in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine[.] Id. at 648, 339 P.3d at 373. On
appeal, Sanchez-Castro argued, in part, that his convictions violated the Idaho
Constitution’s protection against double jeopardy, because under the pleading theory
trafficking and conspiracy are the same offense.
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See id. at 649, 339 P.3d at 374.

Sanchez-Castro argued that because both the conspiracy and the trafficking count alleged
that he possessed 400 grams or more of methamphetamine, that they were the same
offense. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Sanchez-Castro’s argument because
the methamphetamine was the “object of the conspiracy,” not the means by which
Sanchez-Castro and his co-conspirators trafficked in methamphetamine. See id.
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine is committed when a person
“knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or [ ] is knowingly in actual
or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of
methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine.”
I.C. § 2732B(a)(4). Knowingly possessing a specified quantity of
methamphetamine is one manner of committing the crime of trafficking.
The language upon which Defendant apparently relies states that he and
others conspired “to traffic in a controlled substance, by knowingly
possessing methamphetamine.” The words “by knowingly possessing
methamphetamine” were not alleged as the means by which the Defendant
and others were alleged to have committed the conspiracy. The words
obviously referred to the object of the conspiracy—they conspired to
traffic in a controlled substance by knowingly possessing
methamphetamine.
Id.

Thus, if Sanchez-Castro’s convictions for conspiracy to traffic 400 grams of

methamphetamine and trafficking in 400 grams of methamphetamine pass the “pleading
theory” test, then Woods’ conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery and first degree
murder should likewise pass.
The “pleading theory” requires more than related conduct.

In Sepulveda,

Sepulveda was charged with intimidating a witness and two violations of a no contact
order. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 88, 383 P.3d at 1258. The witness, L.M., was the same
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person who was protected by the no contact order. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
determined there was no double jeopardy violation under the “pleading theory” because
“from the face of the information, not all the elements of intimidating a witness are pled
in the counts charging the attempted violations of the no contact order.” Id. Count I, the
intimidating a witness charge, alleged that Sepulveda asked a third party to tell L.M. to lie
to the court. See id. Counts II and III, the violations of the no contact order, alleged that
Sepulveda violated the no contact order by asking two third parties to contact L.M. See
id.
Neither Count II [Violation of a No Contact Order] nor Count III
[Violation of a No Contact Order] makes reference to whether L.M. was a
witness or whether Sepulveda “did ... or did attempt to intimidate,
influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent [L.M.] ... from testifying.”
Thus, felony intimidating a witness was not pled as a means or element of
the commission of either of the attempted violations of a no contact order.
Id. The same is true here. The charging language for conspiracy to commit robbery and
robbery involve related events, like in Sepulveda, but also like in Sepulveda, not all of the
elements in conspiracy to commit robbery are pled in robbery. For example, conspiracy
to commit robbery requires an agreement. (See R., pp. 32-35.) Robbery does not require
an agreement. (See id.) The conspiracy charge also includes Mr. Henkel and Mr. Tracy.
(See id.) The robbery charge does not. (Id.) Since the conspiracy to commit robbery is
not a lesser included offense of robbery, then it is not a lesser included offense of the
robbery element of first degree murder.
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The cases relied upon by Woods are inapplicable. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 1320 (citing Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 567-568, 682 P.2d at 108-109; Sterely, 112 Idaho at
1099, 739 P.2d at 398.) The decision in Gallatin is based upon Idaho Code § 18-301,
which has been repealed. See Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 569, 682 P.2d at 110 (“We hold
therefore that, under I.C. § 18-301, Gallatin can be convicted and sentenced of only one
crime but not both.”). Gallatin is also inapplicable to the “pleading theory” analysis
because, as described above, the “pleading theory” requires the court to look only at the
charging instrument, whereas Gallatin explicitly considered the evidence at trial. See
Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 568-569, 682 P.2d at 109-110. Woods’ reliance on Sterely is
likewise misplaced. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-19 (citing Sterely, 112 Idaho at 1099,
739 P.2d at 398).) Sterely also analyzed whether a conviction violated the repealed
statute, Idaho Code § 18-301. See Sterely, 112 Idaho at 1099, 739 P.2d at 398 (“We next
address the issue of whether the conviction and sentencing of Sterley for the crimes of
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance was
violative of the statutory prohibition against multiple punishment under I.C. § 18–301.”).
Even the more recent case, McKinney, is based upon Idaho Code § 18-301.

See

McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841-842, 291 P.3d at 1040-1041 (analyzing McKinney’s claim
under Idaho Code § 18-301). As a result, these cases are inapplicable, especially in light
of the “pleading theory” as recently articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87, 383 P.3d at 1257.
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See

Pursuant to the pleading theory,

conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense of robbery. As a result, a
conspiracy was not the means by which the first degree murder was charged. There was
no violation of Woods’ unwaived constitutional rights. Woods fails to meet the first
prong of the fundamental error analysis.

2.

There Is No Clear Error On The Record

There is no clear error on the record. The pleading theory requires this Court to
review the face of the indictment. See Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87, 383 P.3d at 1257. It
is not clear from the face of the indictment that conspiracy to commit robbery is a lesser
included offense of robbery, let alone a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
Woods has failed to show the second prong of the fundamental error analysis.

3.

Even If There Was Clear Error From The Record That Error Is Harmless
Because Of Woods’ Proposed Remedy

There was no clear error in this case, but even if there were, Woods is still
required to show the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. See Moad, 156
Idaho at 657, 330 P.3d at 403 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). Here,
Woods argues that the error is not harmless because he has two convictions instead of
one. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.) However, Woods goes on to argue that the
appropriate remedy is to “simply vacate Mr. Woods’s conviction and sentence on the
murder charge.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.)
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Thus Woods apparently claims it is the murder conviction that violated his
unwaived constitutional right.

This remedy simply does not follow from Woods’

argument, which is predicated on the conspiracy charge being a lesser included offense of
the murder charge. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-20.) Nowhere does Woods argue that
the charge of first degree murder was the means by which he committed conspiracy to
commit robbery. (See id.) Thus the harm claimed by Woods (the murder conviction)
does not flow from the unwavied constitutional right he alleges (that conspiracy to
commit robbery is a lesser included offense of first degree murder). As a result Woods
has failed to show the third prong of the fundamental error analysis. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
However, in the event this Court determines that Woods’ proposed remedy does
not control his harmless error analysis, then the appropriate remedy would be to merge
Woods’ claimed lesser included charge, the conspiracy to commit robbery charge, into
the murder charge. However, since Woods has failed to actually show that conspiracy to
commit robbery is a lesser included offense of robbery and thus an element of murder,
Woods’ fundamental error claims fail and this Court need not address harmless error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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